Sources

  1. Ethics - Theories and Applications by Francis Evangelista and Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr. (Chapter 5)

Distributive Justice

Introduction

A fundamental part of organizations are their distribution system. Because it affects moral persons, the distribution method have a moral dimension which we can evaluate: it is morally good when it distributes fairly; otherwise, it is morally wrong.

Distributive justice is an ethical theory that investigates the essential features of a fair distribution. It is considered a virtue ethics type of ethical theory because it focuses on the virtue of justice, in which humans and institutions are morally evaluated as agents of distribution.

Foundations of Distributive Justice

Why We Ought to Treat Others Justly

  • The idea that justice is a virtue underlies Aristotle and Plato’s theories of justice. Virtue is achieved when one performs their natural function well (e.g., a knife being useful for cutting).
  • Aristotle contends that justice is divided into a general level—the level in which justice is a system virtue—and a particular level—the level where justice is an individual virtue.
  • Plato, on the contrary, argues that justice can be a system virtue when the elements of a state or an individual’s soul harmoniously achieve their basic individual virtues.

Plato believed that justice as a virtue can either be on an individual level or a social level (or state).

  1. Individual level
    • The human body is composed of a body and a soul, with soul being the only inherent component.
    • When the body achieves its system virtue—functions of its elements (e.g., organs) are harmoniously and excellently performing—it manifests in the form of health.
    • When the soul achieves its system virtue, it manifests in the form of justice—its master virtue. To achieve this, its three fundamental elements—reason, spirit (or passion), and appetite (or desire)—must be performing well and harmoniously. The resulting virtues for achieving these three are the following:
      1. wisdom - when reason overrides impulses.
      2. courage - when spirit follows and supports reason.
      3. temperance - when appetite follows both reason and spirit.
  2. State level
    • Plato thinks that the ideal state consists of the following classes:
      1. rulers, which would ideally be both a competent leader and knowledgeable in philosophy;
      2. military; and
      3. merchants, which includes farmers and craftsmen.
    • The classes share the same virtues as the soul’s elements because their primary functions correspond to one another, that is
      1. rulers reason;
      2. military spirit; and
      3. merchants appetite.

Plato states that a class should not interfere with the functions of another class; doing so, will result in social disharmony, confusion of roles, and increased bias. For example, a ruler taking part in business (a merchant’s function) will turn his ruling decisions more impartial—he will implement policies that favor his business interests. If the classes all harmoniously and excellently perform their functions, like the soul and its elements, they achieve their master virtue, justice.


Aristotle describes justice as having two levels:

  1. General level
    • One can achieve a higher virtue of justice by following all the laws of a state, which, presumably, cultivate all individual moral virtues (referred to as a complete virtue). It is, in this regard, a system virtue.
  2. Particular level
    • Justice, in a particular sense, pertains to fairness with respect to dealings with other citizens of the state.
    • It is considered an individual virtue because it is on the same level as the individual moral virtues (e.g., patience, modesty, etc.).
    • Aristotle asserts that there are two types of particular justice:
      1. Distributive justice - fairness in the distribution of benefits (desirable things) and burdens (undesirable things).
      2. Corrective justice - fairness in correcting injustices or in restoring justice.
    • To determine what actions are fair for both types of particular justice, Aristotle developed the principle of proportionality.
      • For distributive justice, group members should receive benefits/burdens in proportion to their contribution to the success/failure of a group.
      • For corrective justice, involves the appropriate punishment/compensation to correct an injustice.

What Makes Distributive Justice Special from the other Kinds of Justice

There are four noteworthy types of justice:

  1. Distributive justice: the fair distribution of burdens and benefits.
  2. Retributive justice: the fair imposition of punishments to wrongdoers. Punishment is closely tethered to accountability, in that it is fair when the degree of it imposed matches the degree of accountability. In summary the punishment is fair when (a) the person deserves to be punished and (b) the degree imposed is proportional to the degree of accountability. There are two criticisms for this kind of justice:
    1. Is there a way to objectively determine how much punishment is enough given a degree of accountability?
    2. Is the goal of punishment to hurt the wrongdoer? Or is it to prevent them from repeating the wrongdoing?
  3. Compensatory justice: pertains to the compensation to people who have lost items, functionality, or well-being (typically as a result of wrongful actions). For cases where one cannot restore the original state of life of the a particular wronged person, an equivalent good is exchanged instead. Nonetheless, a major issue is in objectively determining that equivalent good.
  4. Procedural justice: the fairness in the decision-making process. A fair decision-making process includes the following components:
    1. consistency in application;
    2. impartiality in implementation;
    3. appropriate representation of those affected in the formulation of a procedure;
    4. and transparency in the procedure implementation.

Among these kinds, distributive justice is the most important one considering that it is fundamental to these kinds:

  1. Retributive justice is concerned with the proper distribution of punishment (burden) to those responsible for a particular wrongdoing.
  2. Compensatory justice is concerned with the proper distribution of compensation (benefits) to those who have unfairly lost something.
  3. Procedural justice is concerned with the fairness in the process involving the distribution of burden(s) and/or benefit(s).

Theories of Distributive Justice

Philosophers developed various theories of distributive justice for determining which method of distribution is considered fair and appropriate for everyone involved.

Egalitarian Justice

Egalitarianism argues that distributions are only fair when they provide equal share to all members of a group. There are two types of egalitarian state distributions:

  1. Political egalitarianism: Equal legal rights for all citizens.
  2. Economic egalitarianism: Equal basic socioeconomic resources for all citizens.

A modern version of egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism, was introduced to address the question “are all instances of inequality unfair?”. It responds by maintaining the position that only the ones resulting from bad luck—things that we are not responsible for—are unfair.

Capitalist Justice

Capitalism holds that distributions are fair when the share of every member is proportional to their contributions to the group’s success.

In a free market system where market forces influence the monetary value of goods and services, capitalist justice thrives. According to Adam Smith, free and fair competition among market players—in which government intervention does not exist—will result in society flourishing.

Socialist Justice

Socialism claims that distributions are fair when the share of every member is proportional to their needs.

It aims to counteract the inequalities that arise from initial endowments in life (also known as natural inequalities), such as genes and the class of one’s parents. In this regard, it conflicts with capitalism (or the free market system), as socialism believes that underpinning the share of each members on their contribution will only exacerbate the problems engendered by their initial endowments in life.

Besides this, socialism suggests that the type of work one is assigned with should match their natural talent in order for work to be fulfilling instead of alienating, thereby correcting the initial inequalities in life.

Justice as Fair Opportunity

This theory states that distributions are only fair when each group members receives a share proportional to the effort they exerted in achieving the group’s goals. According to Joel Feinberg a just distribution requires a criterion wherein every member has a fair opportunity to work. For him, effort fills that role of the criterion; nonetheless, he acknowledges that life’s initial endowments may affect the effort a person might exert (e.g., motivation of disabled people). Unlike other criteria, however, effort is the least affected by initial endowments (unlike contribution and needs, which are both highly influenced by one’s initial life advantages and disadvantages), and, as such, is the ideal criterion for justice as fair opportunity.

Utilitarian Justice

This theory of justice contends that any distribution is fair as long as it leads to the maximum aggregate welfare (or intrinsic good). In theory, it can follow any other patterns (e.g. socialist justice, capitalist justice, etc.); however, its primary goal is to maximize the aggregate good, while the pattern it follows only has an instrumental value determined by its capacity to fulfill the primary goal.

This theory of justice is often criticized for accepting the violation of human rights when it maximizes the overall aggregate welfare. This can occur when some individuals do not receive their share of the distribution to prioritize the overall good of the group.

Justice as Fairness

This theory, as advanced by John Rawls, postulates that a fair distribution is one where its governing principles are chosen by members in an objective or impartial way. Rawls invented the original position procedure for choosing principles in an impartial way. In this procedure, people imagine that they are under the veil of ignorance, wherein they ignore their features that are irrelevant to the point of negotiation (such as economic status, etc.); as a result, their approach in choosing distributive principles would be objective and fair to everyone.

This theory implies that if the principles chosen for the distribution are fair, it follows that the distribution, likewise, will be fair. Rawls also introduced two principles:

  1. Principle of equality: it states that everyone should have equal basic rights and liberties.
  2. Principle of fair inequality: it states that, considering social and economic inequalities, distributions should have the two following principles: (a) provide equal opportunities for people to improve their life, and (b) be arranged in a way that benefits everyone (especially the less wealthy members).

Libertarian Justice

Robert Nozick introduced the Libertarian Justice Theory (or the Entitlement Theory)—a theory that claims that fair distributions require moral rights (particularly property rights) to be respected when acquiring and transferring the ownership of goods. It presupposes that distribution involves two processes of acquiring properties and giving its ownership to other people. This theory ignores the suggested patterns in distributions because it believes that strict adherence to the patterns can result in moral rights being undermined.

For distributive justice to be realized, the property must be acquired through morally good means (not stolen), and, likewise, its ownership must also be transferred in a morally good manner (not forced). In case these were not achieved, distributive justice can be realized through the rectification of injustices.

Nozick introduced the moral side constraint to ensure that moral rights are not violated: it is a principle that holds that each person should be treated as ends. This entails that everyone in the acquiring and transferring ownership process are informed and voluntarily consent when they participate. Consequently, forcing people to surrender their property rights so that a pattern of distribution is satisfied is a violation of the moral side constraint (people are being treated as means).

Ethics of Care

The ethics of care emerged as a response to the notion that Utilitarianism and Deontology are distant to the reality of moral experience. However, despite its emphasis on character-building and cultivating moral virtues, it distinguishes itself from Aristotelian ethics as it views this as biased in favor of male-oriented values, whereas care ethics also include female-oriented values.

Introduced by women psychologists and philosophers, this theory illuminated the moral experiences of women. Nonetheless, it is a universal and non-sex specific theory because it can be applicable for all sexes. In contrast to traditional moral theories, this theory suggests that humans are naturally connected with one another—the basic unit of moral philosophy is not an individual, rather a mother-child relationship. It, therefore, centers its goal towards preserving human relationships.

Another difference between traditional moral theories and care ethics is in their views on impartiality: traditional moral theories believe that moral decisions should be objective, universal, and free from the influences of personal identity (such as ethnic background, religious background, etc.), while care ethics claims that care for things involving our identity is essential in making an ethical response since it constitutes our happiness.

Gilligan’s Criticisms of Kohlberg’s Ideas

While investigating the morality of abortion, Gilligan interviewed women on their perspective of morality, and realized that it was incompatible with Lawrence Kohlberg’s framework. She noticed that his framework was insufficient in that it does not call attention to this different view of morality, and, as such, became a critic of Kohlberg’s theory.

One of her contentions was that justice is not the most important criterion for moral rightness. This criterion was governed by abstract rules which focused on resolving conflicting rights based on which precedes the other. Hence, autonomous moral reasoning, in this perspective, was about determining how to fairly balance rights.

Gilligan asserts that Kohlberg’s three levels of moral development is gender-biased as it only represents the moral perspective of men, and that it only studied white and rich men. She states that, due to their individualistic view of the self and predisposition to impartiality, men see morality as an issue of conflicting rights. In contrast, the women’s conception of the self—interdependent and connected with others—meant that morality was a challenge of resolving conflicting responsibilities. The concern for others and the desire to make and nurture harmonious relationships underlies this viewpoint.

Gilligan believes that the differences in the conception of morality between the two sexes emerges from how they were raised: boys are raised to be independent, achievement-oriented, and assertive; whereas, girls are raised to be empathetic and nurturing. For this reason, she puts forward the idea that the levels of moral development is different for men and women, but neither is better or worse.

Lastly, Gilligan highlighted issues that emerges from having two different approaches depending on the sex: because of the relationship and responsibility based conception of morality, women tend to have an underdeveloped conception of their own rights, needs, or self-responsibilities; on the other hand, men tend to struggle with intimacy and connection, and have problems with negotiating problems of communication in relationships. For Gilligan, the challenge is to learn how to recognize one’s identity and needs, while also seeing the importance of relationships with others.

Alternative Theory of Moral Development

To design a framework describing the moral development of women, Gilligan interviewed 29 pregnant women on their stances on abortion. After her analysis of their responses, she summarized their moral growth into three levels, where each level represents a milestone which corresponds to the depth of one’s understanding on the relationship between their own perspective and the rights and concerns of others.

Level 1: Individual Survival Orientation

At the first stage, a woman is only concerned with their own needs and desires, thereby ignoring the needs and desires of others.

Transition 1: From Selfishness to Responsibility

This transition occurs when one recognizes that their own interests can conflict with the morally right action.

Level 2: Goodness as Self-sacrifice

At this level, a woman practices many traditional feminine values and assess themselves according to their interpersonal relationships—their primary goal is to protect and support the best interest of others, even if it is detrimental to themselves. As a result, it becomes difficult for them to make the right decisions when the interests of multiple people clashes with one another.

Transition 2: From Goodness to Truth

This transitional period is marked by the capacity to acknowledge one’s self-importance and question the morality of self-sacrifice. Although a woman will still try to be responsible to others (goodness), they will also look out for themselves and admit that it can be wrong to hurt oneself (truth).

Level 3: The Morality of Nonviolence

At the final level, the moral judgments of a woman is founded on the principle of not hurting anyone, where they also consider that their importance is equal to that of others.

The main difference between the female and male constructions of the moral domain is that the former focuses on care, while the latter focuses on following rules. In other words, care and responsibility is the most vital factor for women when making moral judgments. Connections and proper care is fundamental in their view, whereas the male perspective mostly stress the need for noninterference and justice.

Natural and Ethical Caring

One writer that further underscored the importance of caring was Nel Noddings. She asserted that ethical caring is not better than natural caring; the former is contingent on the latter. She grounds this claim by using Hume’s argument—morality is founded on feeling. For this reason, she blurs the line between what one ought to do and what one wants to do.

Noddings suggests avoiding those devoid of empathy because they are abnormal. Furthermore, she states that, although humans are not required to care, they can still accept their natural response (care) and act selflessly, since this is a natural part of being human. In other words, we have the choice to act according to our caring emotion, or reject it and not act.1

Noddings believes that the desire to be moral comes from the innate human desire to connect and stay connected with others. Furthermore, she thinks that mainstream philosophies, like Kant’s, often lead to the detachment of our human nature from ethics and rationality, something which she thinks is wrong.

Person or Principle

Criticisms of Care Ethics

Footnotes

  1. I’m not confident with my interpretation for this one. Noddings stated something that potentially contradicts with my interpretation: if the moral agent feels like they cannot do anything to change the outcome, they can choose to not act and, therefore, not care about it. As a result, they are removed from the moral dilemma. In this regard, it is possible to care but feel like you cannot accomplish what you ought to do or aim to achieve.